

VE-HEP: **H**ardening the value chain through open source, trustworthy **E**DA tools and **P**rocessors



Formal Verification as a Means to Trustworthiness

Milan Funck, Tim Henkes, Norbert Herfurth, Christoph Lüth, Steffen Reith, Arnd Weber


10.03.2022



VE-HEP: Hardening the value chain through open source, trustworthy EDA tools and processors

- Project Goal: **Reliability** and **Trustworthiness** by
 - Open Source hardware (RISC-V)
 - Open Source tool chain (OpenRoad)
 - Formal verification

- Demonstrator:
 - Hardware Security Module
 - Based on VexRiscV
- Covers the whole value chain:



... to IHP fab.

... via OpenRoad ...

From SpinalHDL ...

Partners:



Associated:



Grant no. ME1ZEUS012/16KIS1342

Verifying a RISC-V CPU



Functional Verification needs

- Specification of desired system behaviour
- Abstract model of the system




Riscv-Formal specifies behaviour (partly)

Abstract model:

- CPU state consists of all registers

Correct behaviour as function

$$State_{N+1} = FS(State_N, Input)$$
$$Output = FO(State_N, Input)$$



Our Approach: Symbolic Model Checking



Extension of the Riscv-Formal interface


- full access to the state (Registers, CSRs, PC)

Let the solver engine choose to either


- start from the reset state, or
- start from any other valid state

Symbolic Model Checking:

- Let the solver choose any input.
- Give the solver just enough cycles to execute
- Verify the correctness of the resulting state and



Tool Chain & Work Flow



Current State of Work

We have verified a simple RISC-V core (μ RV32I)

- ~3580 lines of Verilog-Code
- No pipeline
- RISC-V 32I with basic set of 17 CSRs

Results for the current proof:

- Verified/covered correct execution of the 37 RISC-V 32I basis instruction:
 - few simple bugs found
- Verified correct behaviour for any other unknown/illegal instruction:
 - multiple decoder-bugs found
- SpinalHDL-Code: ~ 1250 lines, generated SystemVerilog code: ~1900 lines
- Execution time: ~3,5 minutes

Future Plans and Potential Problems

- **Future Plans:**
 - Extend verification to VexRiscv -- pipeline is challenging
 - Extend verification for fence-, ecall-, and basis csr-instructions
 - Equivalence check for hardened processor
- **When is a State valid?**
 - CPU-Abstraction loses other internal registers
- **Some insider knowledge is required**
 - No longer a black box verification

Trustworthiness by Formal Verification



Concept/Specification/Design:

- Unintentional vulnerabilities:
 - Example in HEP: RISC-V ISA
 - Prove all instructions are implemented correctly
 - Prove further invalid instructions are handled correctly
 - Hardening does not introduce vulnerabilities
- The Importance of Being Formal:
 - allows reasoning about completeness and consistency;
 - specifications are well-defined and unambiguous;
 - reviewing focusses on specification, not implementation.
- Works well with open source (hardware and software)
 - Anybody can run the verification for themselves.

Thank you for your attention!



For more information:

<http://hep-alliance.org/>

Contact:



Prof. Christoph Lüth
Deutsches Forschungszentrum für Künstliche Intelligenz (DFKI)
christoph.lueth@dfki.de
<http://www.informatik.uni-bremen.de/~clueth>